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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-1799
___________
JENIFFER BRIGHT,
Appellant
v.
LABCORP; GUARANG PATEL
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-02359)
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 18, 2015
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed September 21, 2015)
___________
OPINION*
___________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

PER CURIAM
Jeniffer Bright appeals pro se from the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment against her in this employment discrimination action. For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
Bright was an employee of Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings
(“LabCorp”) from May 17, 2004, until her termination on November 15, 2011. “As a
LabCorp ‘accessioner,’ [Bright] processed and coded medical specimens and entered
relevant information into a computer database. A ‘group lead’ handed out assignments
and made sure that work was completed.” (Suppl. App. at 1-2 (citation omitted).)
In January 2011, Bright “received a written warning from LabCorp for ‘continuing
workplace disruptions’ based on two internal complaints against her from two different
co-workers. The warning provided that ‘[a]ny subsequent work place disruption will
result in additional disciplinary action, including termination.’” (Id. at 2 (citation
omitted).)
According to Bright, on October 26, 2011, her “group lead,” Guarang Patel,
grabbed her arm very hard while he was talking to her. Bright reported this alleged
incident to her supervisor, an assistant vice president, and LabCorp’s Compliance Action
Line. LabCorp investigated the report and ultimately issued a verbal warning to Patel.
During that investigation, Patel and others indicated that Bright had been refusing work
assignments. After the investigation, LabCorp terminated Bright’s employment.
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Bright subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Bright, who is black, alleged that the “physical
harassment” she suffered, as well as her termination, were the product of racial
discrimination and unlawful retaliation. (Suppl. App. at 38.) The EEOC ultimately
dismissed that charge, stating that the agency’s investigation was “unable to conclude
that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes.” (Id. at 41.)
After obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Bright filed a pro se
complaint in the District Court against LabCorp and Patel, essentially reiterating the
allegations from her EEOC charge. In March 2013, the District Court granted Patel’s
motion to dismiss the claims against him, explaining that individual employees cannot be
held liable under Title VII. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d
1061, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).1
Bright’s case then proceeded to the discovery phase, after which LabCorp moved
for summary judgment. In her opposition to LabCorp’s motion, Bright alleged facts in
addition to the arm-grabbing incident involving Patel. She claimed that her LabCorp coworkers subjected her to “an extended list of . . . childish and juvenile antics,” including
the following:
co-workers would take my work and switch the paperwork
and specimens so I would make mistakes; my group lead
would make sure that I did not get work or take it from me to
1

Bright does not challenge that decision in this appeal.
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give to someone else so that I would not reach my quota; my
chair wood [sic] be hidden from me, my computer unplugged,
[and] my supplies taken from my desk when I stepped away
from it.
(Suppl. App. at 3 (quoting Bright’s Opp’n to Summ. J. Mot.).) Bright also alleged that
Patel screamed at her like a child. According to Bright, she complained about these
various incidents to her superiors, but these complaints were ignored because of her race.
Bright believes that the short amount of time between her complaint about the armgrabbing incident and her subsequent termination strongly indicates retaliation on the part
of LabCorp.
On November 30, 2014, the District Court granted LabCorp’s motion. The
District Court construed Bright’s complaint as raising two claims under Title VII — one
alleging a hostile work environment and the other alleging retaliation — and concluded
that both lacked merit. This timely appeal followed.2
II.
We have jurisdiction over Bright’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We
review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard
as the district court.” S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 256
(3d Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate when the “movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

The District Court granted Bright’s timely motion to extend the time to appeal under
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), and Bright filed her notice of appeal within
the time required by that rule.
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matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Although “[w]e view the facts and draw all
reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor,” we will conclude that “[a] disputed
issue is ‘genuine’ only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury
could find for the non-moving party.” Resch v. Krapf’s Coaches, Inc., 785 F.3d 869, 871
n.3 (3d Cir. 2015).
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any
individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under Title
VII, a plaintiff must establish the following: “1) [she] suffered intentional discrimination
[based on a protected ground], 2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive, 3) the
discrimination detrimentally affected [her], 4) the discrimination would detrimentally
affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat
superior liability.” Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013).
Here, the District Court concluded that Bright’s hostile work environment claim failed as
a matter of law because she did not identify facts demonstrating that she suffered
discrimination on the basis of a protected ground. Although Bright’s complaint alleged
that the discrimination against her was race-based, the District Court emphasized that she
“testified at her deposition that the treatment she received from Patel and her other coworkers had nothing to do with race.” (Suppl. App. at 5.) The District Court explained
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that “[t]his was not a one-time acknowledgment,” as “[n]umerous deposition exchanges
addressed this issue.” (Id.)
On appeal, Bright repeatedly states that this lawsuit is not race-based, and claims
that Patel’s “motivations are irrelevant to my claim as my grievance deals with the assault
directly, not the motivation behind it. Anything that is assumed to have a racial basis in
my claim would have simply been taken out of context.” (Bright’s Opening Br. 6-7.)
Furthermore, Bright does not allege facts demonstrating that the claimed discrimination
was based on a protected ground other than race. Accordingly, we agree with the District
Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of LabCorp on Bright’s hostile
work environment claim.
We now turn to Bright’s retaliation claim. “A prima facie case of illegal
retaliation requires a showing of (1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by
the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and
(3) a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s
adverse action.” EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted). If the plaintiff makes this showing,
the burden of production of evidence shifts to the employer to
present a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for having taken
the adverse action. If the employer advances such a reason,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
employer’s proffered explanation was false, and that
retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment
action.
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Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Assuming for the sake of argument that Bright has made a prima facie showing of
retaliation, her claim nevertheless fails and we need not disturb the District Court’s
decision to grant summary judgment against her. LabCorp proffered a legitimate, nonretaliatory explanation for terminating her employment. Specifically, less than a year
after Bright received a written warning for “continuing workplace disruptions,” her coworkers informed LabCorp that she was refusing work assignments. We agree with the
District Court that Bright “failed to present evidence from which a trier of fact could find
that [LabCorp’s] alleged non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual.” (Suppl. App. at
9.) Although Bright was terminated shortly after she complained about the incident
involving Patel, it was during the investigation of that very complaint that LabCorp was
informed that she had been refusing work assignments. Accordingly, the timeline of
events, standing alone, would not cause a reasonable factfinder to conclude that
LabCorp’s non-retaliatory basis for terminating Bright was merely pretextual. See
Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 427 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The plaintiff’s evidence, if it
relates to the credibility of the employer’s proffered justification, must demonstrate such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could
rationally find them unworthy of credence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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